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I. INTRODUCTION
The prospects for obtaining the desired levels of
personnel to adequately man our armed services look very
bleak in the 1980' s. That is, of course, based on projec-
tions of current policies of recruitment, attrition, and
allocation of personnel. Currently more than 80% of
enlisted recruits leave before completing five years of
service (Defense Manpower Report, 1976)..
Since the military services have virtually no provi-
sions to directly fill billets at intermediate or higher
levels with personnel from the general population they
must rely on a flow of people who have "come through the
ranks." It is for this reason that the currently low
levels of enlisted recruitment and high levels of attrition
are matters of great concern.
In order to attack this problem military personnel
management strategies have emphasized training, turnover
rates, recruiting and other macro-level variables. By
manipulation of these variables DoD hopes to influence
individuals to react in ways to alleviate the manpower
problem.
Recent work by Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1978)
discusses at great length the inherent difficulties of
predicting individual behaviors on the basis of aggregate
or macro-level factors and vice versa. Since it appears

that DoD may be trying to do just that when it formulates
its manpower strategies, a closer look at some of the many
possible interrelationships between the attitudes and
intentions of individual persons and the social aggregate
they comprise seems very appropriate.
This study will begin with a review of Schelling's
work, particularly his models of the ways that expectations
can influence behavior, and the relationships between
people and "their" environment.
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to develop a
computer model which will mathematically simulate the
interplay of individual level variables such as attitude
or individual actions with more macro-level variables such
as organizational behavior or environmental outcome.
Through various regression and analytical techniques it is
hoped that the more influential variables will be discerned
Although primarily theoretical in nature, this process may
reveal some key relationships or driving forces which are
of use to manpower strategists, as well as decision
theorists and scholars of complex organizations.

II. MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR
The title of this section is taken from Thomas C.
Schelling's 1978 book in which he discusses several models
of social interaction and collective behavior. He contends
that efforts to predict aggregate behavior on the basis of
individual intentions or vice versa are highly prone to
error. The interrelationships between these factors are
often more complex than one being a simple summation of
the other . The next few pages are a review of some of
Schelling's models.
A. CRITICAL MASS BEHAVIOR
This model is based on a term used in nuclear physics.
For our purposes critical mass behavior deals with a
situation or activity that is self-sustaining once enough
people are engaged in it.
In order to provide a better understanding of the
concept we consider the following illustration.
Assume a local recruiter decides to hold a series of
weekly meetings for high school students where questions
about military careers can be discussed, where training
on basic military skills is provided, and hopefully a
desire to become part of the military service is developed.
Attendance at these meetings is completely optional and
the students are free to attend as many or as few meetings
as they care to.
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Many different factors go into the decision each
student makes whether or not to attend a particular weekly
meeting. We are interested in those students whose
decision to attend is influenced by what they think their
schoolmates will do.
One particular student, for example, may attend a
meeting if he thinks at least 30% of his fellow students
will be there. Another may attend only if he is sure at
least 80% of his schoolmates will be attending. Another
student may attend even if he thinks no one else will be
there. In other words, for everybody whose attendance
depends on the attendance he anticipates there is some
critical number or proportion which will just convince
him to go to the meeting.
By tabulating the number of students who feel a
particular value of expected attendance is "just enough"
to make them go to the meeting we can determine a frequency
distribution.
In cumulative form a frequency distribution curve
describes for any number of anticipated attendance, the
number of people for whom that number is large enough. At
40 it registers all the people whose critical numbers are
no larger than 40. At zero it indicates the number who
would attend even if no one else did. At 100 the diagram
records everyone except those who never attend.
11

Figure 2-1 is a cumulative frequency curve of students
whose attendance at a meeting depends on the anticipated
level of attendance. Assuming a population of 100
students it can be seen from the diagram that there are
2 individuals who will attend the meeting even if no one
else is expected to show up. If everyone is expected











Suppose the students each expect 25 or 30 persons to
show up for the first meeting. With that expectation
about 10 individuals will actually be there. Many of them
will be disappointed with only 3 or 4 of them wanting to
attend a meeting of 10 people. At the next meeting we
should expect a smaller turnout of maybe 3 or 4 people.
At this small meeting there will still be some disappointed,
and after several more meetings only the 2 diehards will
still be attending.
Suppose, that at the first meeting, instead of 25 or
30 persons expected, we have 65 expected. From the diagram
we see that nearly 7 5 will actually show up, and none of
them will be disappointed with the attendance. In fact,
there are others who would have been present at this
meeting had these 75 been expected. Next week if 75 are
expected, over 85 will show, and by the following week all
will be present except for those who never attend.
Notice that in the first part of our example we had
25 or 30 people expected. Notice also that at this value
the distribution curve is below the dashed 4 5-degree
reference line sketched in Figure 2-1. In the second part
of our example we had an initial expectation of 65 people.
At this value the curve is above the 4 5-degree reference
line. Further examination will reveal that any expected
attendances where the curve is below the reference line
result in actual attendances that diminish successively to
the next lower point where those attending are not
13

disappointed (in this case, where actual attendance is 2) .
Any expected attendances above the 4 5-degree line result
in actual attendances that increase successively towards
the next higher equilibrium point (in this case, actual
attendance of 90)
.
Shifting our attention to Figure 2-2 we see what
Schelling calls the "case of the dying seminar" (Schelling,
p. 105). Critical mass cannot be achieved. In this
situation the number of individuals who show up at a
meeting is always less than the number expected. Everyone
who attends is disappointed and successively they drop out











Schelling points out that for some behaviors, like
language or fashion, it is proportions that influence
people, not absolute numbers, while for other behaviors
it will be absolute numbers that attract or repel
(Schelling, p. 109)
.
In our preceding discussion we dealt with more than a
small, intimate group of students. If we assume that these
individuals are more affected by the proportion of their
group that is going to the meeting there may be some hope
for the recruiter faced with an overall frequency distribu-
tion as in Figure 2-2. The hope lies in the possibility
of dividing or separating populations. Schelling contends
that if people are influenced by local populations — the
people they work with, eat with, go to school with, play
with, or ride the bus with, any local concentration of
the people most likely to display a certain behavior
(i.e., go to the meeting) will enhance the likelihood that,
at least in that locality, the activity will reach critical
mass (Schelling, p. 109)
.
If the recruiter we described earlier finds himself
faced with a population whose behavior is reflected in
Figure 2-2 there is an opportunity to avoid a "dying
seminar" if he divides his population into more susceptible
and less susceptible halves.
To illustrate the usefulness of this idea refer back
to Figure 2-2. If the top half of the diagram is cut off;
that is, sliced horizontally at 50 on the vertical axis,
15

the lower half remaining describes the population half
most easily induced to attend. Disregard the top half
of the diagram. Those are the 50 people with the highest
critical values.
Looking only at those people from the lower half of
the diagram a cumulative frequency distribution for this
group by itself can be developed.
Since there are only 1/2 the number of people as in
our original population it is necessary to recalibrate
the vertical axis to read 100% where it used to read 50.
Because the vertical scale has been compressed the 45-degree
reference line is replaced by a line with a slope of 1/2.







As can be seen the curve now has values above the
reference line. Since this is the line where the propor-
tion expected exactly equals the proportion attending, any
points on the curve above the line are points where
critical mass is sustainable. As stated earlier, if it
is proportions that matter and not absolute numbers we
have created a situation in which full attendance by half
the students is now possible. By separating away half the
population, in this case those least likely to attend,
the influence of everybody who attends is doubled. We
have, in effect, doubled the persentage that he or she
represents.
Looking at the students in the illustration the recruiter
may find that when taken in total as a group of students in
grades 9-12 they exhibit the unfavorable behavioral charac-
teristics of Figure 2-2. If he is able to separate them
into local populations, for example by grade level, or
ethnic group, he may find that certain groups display more
favorable characteristics. He may find for example that
freshman and sophomores comprise the bulk of the group
that is least likely to attend the meetings. By restricting
the meetings to only juniors and seniors he may be able to
sustain good attendance by this subgrouping of students.
B. SUBCLASSES OF CRITICAL MASS BEHAVIOR
1 . Tipping
Tipping is a special case of critical-mass
phenomena. It involves people being someplace rather than
17

doing something. According to Schelling the term was
first applied to neighborhood migration (Schelling, p. 101)
It was observed that the entrance of a few members of a
minority into a neighborhood often caused some among the
previously homogeneous group to leave. Their departure
made space available for more members of the minority to
move in. The increase in new residents of this particular
race or ethnic background induced more of the old residents
to leave, and so on. Motivation for the older residents
to depart could be based on the number of minority entrants
who had already arrived, or based on some fear that the
process would continue forcing them to sell their homes at
low prices in the future.
In addition to the process of "tipping out" just
described there is the process of "tipping in." As the
number of new minority residents grows, the neighborhood
becomes more attractive to those of the minority race
inducing more of them to move in.
Instead of critical numbers this model uses the
term "tolerances." Assuming there is a particular area or
organization (e.g. U.S. military) to be in, each person,
black or white, has his own tolerance. He will want to be
in the organization unless the percentage of members of
opposite color exceeds some limit. If a person's limit
(tolerance) is exceeded he will go some place else where
his color predominates or where his color does not matter.
People move out of the organization if the ratio is not
18

within their limit; people outside move in if they see
it meets their demands.
If we look at a particular organization (e.g.
U.S. Army) we find a certain color ratio exists. Applying
the model we find that of two members of the same color
the one with the lesser tolerance will leave first as
the size of the minority increases. We find that members
of a particular color in the organization have higher
tolerances than any persons of the same color outside the
organization.
Schelling discusses the feasilibity of restricting
the number of people of majority race allowed to enter.
Doing so will often produce a stable equilibrium in other-
wise unstable conditions. When there are two or more
potentially stable situations where everyone's tolerance
level can be satisfied it appears that initial occupancies
and rates of movement determine which situation will
result (Schelling, p. 164) .
The interested reader will find a more detailed




Congestion is the case where as the number of people
expected to do something increases the desirability of
joining in becomes less attractive. An example might be
the attendance at an ice skating rink. If the expected
19

attendance is low many people will go because they like
the idea of lots of room to skate. If the expectation is
that the place will be crowded, few people will go because
it's no fun to be out on a crowded rink with no room to








This model is closely related to congestion.
According to Schelling, "the commons" has come to serve
as a paradigm for situations in which people so impinge
on each other in pursuing their own interests that
collectively they might be better off if they could be
restrained, but no one gains individually by self-
restraint" (Schelling, p. Ill) .
The idea originally came from the situation in
New England where a common pasture was not only common
property of the villagers but also available to their
animals for grazing. There were no restrictions on the
use of the land, so as long as there was any profit in
grazing one's animal on the common, villagers were
motivated to do so.
Three levels of usage are possible:
(1) Good Economy: more would be lost than gained by
restricting use.
(2) Next level is where every user still benefits but
aggregate benefits are reduced by excessive use.
(3) Third level is when there is so much usage as to
extinguish the value of the common.
Some applications of the situation above are the
common pools of natural resources such as petroleum where
the tendency is to overexploit now for quick profits.
In many government organizations there are people
exercising tenure, thus preventing the upward movement of
21

more qualified replacements. They stay because they would
have to give up their seniority if they moved into a new
organization.
C. THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING
Hopefully the preceding discussion has made the reader
more appreciative of the many possible relationships
between individual attitudes, expectations, environmental
situation, and aggregate behaviors. Even in cases where
population characteristics are known and individual
motivations are given the situational outcomes are not
always straight-forward or intuitively obvious.
The main intention of this discussion has been to
illustrate the potential complexity of relationships
between individual attitudes and aggregate behavior,
thereby demonstrating the relevance of studying models of
social interaction and collective behavior.
The next section of this thesis starts out with a
simple model of organizational decision-making and explores
the relationships between the variables in much greater
depth. The relationships turn out to be much more complex
and surprising than would be expected given the simplicity
of the basic model.
Since a variety of Navy manpower concerns involve the
same variables and similar decision-making situations as
those presented in the models it is important that the
properties and implications of the models be understood by
those in a position to apply them.
22

III. THE COMPLETE CYCLE OF CHOICE
A. THE BASIC CYCLE
There is a familiar model of organizational learning
referred to by March and Olsen as the Complete Cycle of
Choice (1975). The cycle starts with an individual person's
assessment or attitude about some portion of the environ-
ment. Based at least partly on this attitude, and on an
assessment of the appropriateness or effectiveness of a
particular course of action an individual exhibits some
behavior. Individual behaviors are then aggregated into
a collective action which is labelled the organizational
outcome. This organizational outcome elicits a "response"
from the environment. The environment is then reassessed
by the individual and the cycle repeats itself. These









Figure 3-1. COMPLETE CYCLE OF CHOICE
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The discussion of critical mass behavior presented
earlier is an illustration of the Complete Cycle of Choice.
Based on the cues he receives from "his" environment an
individual develops expectations about the number of people
that will be present at a particular place at a given time.
Depending on his own attitudes about the desirability of
attending a meeting with the expected number of people he
will either attend the meeting or he will choose some
alternative course of action. The number of individuals
who actually show up at the meeting can be considered the
organizational outcome. The organizational outcome leads
to an environmental "response" (i.e. a consensus concerning
the level of meeting attendance) which is then interpreted
by each of the individuals. Based on these interpretations
new expectations are formed about the next meeting and the
cycle repeats itself.
Although they may be simplistic the ideas incorporated
in the cycle provide a useful starting point for theories
of organizational behavior. It must be conceded that under
certain conditions the model has limitations which make it
non-representative of the flow of events. In particular
these are occasions where participation in the learning
process is fluid, where the organizational processes are
not understood, and where goals or attitudes are retro-
actively applied to actions that have already taken place.
Situations exhibiting these characteristics are sometimes
referred to as "organized anarchies" (Cohen and March, 1974)
24

B. DEC IS ION-MAKING IN ORGANIZED ANARCHIES
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with
applications of the Complete Cycle of Choice in rational
situations where participation
,
processes, and outcomes are
clearly defined and well understood it seems appropriate
to point out some limitations in the model. The model is
not designed to be applied to ambiguous, irrational
decision-making situations.
Since later sections of this thesis explicitly define
situations where the model is most appropriate, this section
will describe situations where the Complete Cycle of Choice
has ' substantial limitations. The ability to recognize the
occasions where the model is inappropriate is necessary to
avoid misapplications.
1. Individual Attitudes and Individual Behavior
Referring to Figure 3-1 it can be seen that the Cycle
of Choice assumes a tightly connected closed cycle. March and
Olsen (1975) believe that when misapplied the model has limi-
tations which become important such as when one or more of
the connections are broken, or confounded by factors not in-
cluded in the model.
Looking at the linkage between individual beliefs and
individual actions March and Olsen suggest that if the notion
is accepted that time and energy are scarce resources then it
is likely that an individual will have to allocate his time
and energy among many choice situations. He will not be able
to attend to all the possible choice situations simultaneously,
?R

Individuals are likely to allocate their available time and
energy to situations with the highest expected return. They
do not act in one area because they are acting in another.
According to March and Olsen (1975) , because of other
claims on attention it would be possible to have individual
attitudes and preferences without behavioral implications in
a specific choice situation.
Regulations, standard operating procedures, duties and
roles often determine behavior in spite of personal attitudes
and preferences. This further serves to suggest a loose
coupling rather than a tight connection between individual
attitudes and individual actions.
2 . Individual Action and Organizational Choice
Looking at the linkage between individual actions and
organizational choices or outcomes there is an implication
that organizational choice is a direct consequence of individual
actions. March and Olsen (1975) suggest that the connection
between the two is often quite loose. Sometimes the internal
decision-making process is not strongly related to the organi-
zational action. Decision outcomes, however, are not the
principal concern of individuals in many choice situations.
In particular there is often more importance attached to the
allocation and acknowledgement of status, collection and




March and Olsen (1975) illustrate this point with two
questions:
a) Why do people fight for the right to participate
and then not spend much time participating?
The answer is because most of the status is conferred
by the right to participate rather than by the actual activity.
b) Why is there a tendency for major policy decisions
to lead to no substantive change?
The answer is because the main concern and pleasure are
in the symbolic content of the debate and the education rather
than in the implementation of the policy.
It seems likely that a common consequence of making
decisions through a process in which most participants are
worrying about something else will be decisions that are
difficult to anticipate.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated for "organized
anarchies" how the internal decision-making process is often
loosely connected to organizational outcomes or actions.
Sometimes external factors such as economic depression com-
pletely change the conditions under which the organization is
operating and thereby cause organizational actions independent
of any internal decision-making process.
3 . Organizational Choice and Environmental Response
The Cycle of Choice assumes a connection between
organizational actions and environmental actions. This action
by the environment is often viewed as a response to the choices
made in the organization. Environmental actions may be better
27

described in terms of relationships among events, people, and
other structures rather than merely as responses to what the
organization does. The same organizational action will have
different "apparent" responses at different times. Different
organizational actions will have the same response.
4 . Environmental Response and Individual Beliefs
Looking at the last linkage in the cycle of choice
it can be seen that environmental events are observed by an
individual. Based on his perceptions of what is happening
or has happened he may adjust his beliefs accordingly. This
experience will hopefully improve his behavior by providing
him feedback.
In "organized anarchies" the learning cycle is compli-
cated by the ambiguity of what environmental "response" actually
took place. Ambiguity may be inherent in the actual events,
or may be caused by the difficulties participants have in
observing them. Extremely complex changes in the environment
may overpower our mental capacities, and force us to abstract
or simplify what has happened, or why it has happened. Often
our interpretations of what has happened rely heavily on the
interpretation offered by others. The degree of ambiguity
will be very dependent on the efficiency of the communication
channels through which we receive these interpretations.
C. DEC IS ION-MAKING IN A RATIONAL SITUATION
This thesis will take a closer look at the Complete Cycle
of Choice when applied to a relatively unambiguous situation.
28

In order to exercise the model's performance in its simplest
form the thesis considers a situation where the four major
variables are closely coupled. It has long been recognized
that in more ambiguous cases the linkages between individual
attitudes and individual actions may be complicated by limited
information-processing capabilities or formal rules of behavior
which may overwhelm an individual's freedom to act completely
in accordance with his own beliefs. This idea of "bounded
rationality" is further developed by Simon (1957)
.
This discussion, however, will deal with a situation,
namely a voting scenario, where the range of behavioral
alternatives is fairly well-defined and where the aggregation
of individual behaviors through a simple summation to deter-
mine an organizational outcome seems plausible. I will assume
short time periods in which behavior is permitted to occur in
order to minimize the timing effects of different individual
actions on the organizational outcome. I further stipulate
that the organizational outcome is directly determined by
internal processes and that external factors affect the out-
come only indirectly.
The organizational action causes an environmental response
which may or may not be perceived by the individuals in the
organization. Additionally, whether individual belief sys-
tems are constructed through self-assessment of the environ-
ment or through the interpretations of others can cause differ-
ent perceptions of a given environment to develop. In this
discussion I will deal with well-defined, unequivocal outcomes
that leave little margin for severe distortions to develop.
29

In order to work with the Complete Cycle of Choice in an
appropriate situation the model is applied to an election
process. I assume a political election with well-defined
voting procedures, a limited number of choices, and general
agreement on whether a particular candidate has received the
majority of the votes, and thereby won the election.
It is believed that imposition of these conditions
qualifies this scenario as a rational decision-making situa-
tion in accordance with the definition for such a situation
as set forth by Karl Weick (1979, pg. 21)
.
Although Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) have described
ambiguous situations such as college univeristy administration
procedures where the decision-making process is more aptly
described by their "Garbage Can Theory," I believe that the
number of situations which can adequately be illustrated by
the Complete Cycle of Choice warrants further research into
the model's characteristics.
D. CYCLE OF CHOICE AS COMPUTER PROGRAM
In order to exercise the learning model under various
conditions within the constraints previously discussed a
computer program has been developed. The program starts out
with some specified initial conditions and then by performing
various transformations simulates the processes that occur
in the theoretical model. After a specified number of itera-
tions through the cycle several summary statistics are gen-




1 . Initial Conditions
The program first defines some initial attitudinal,
behavioral, and environmental conditions. In order to do
this a system of matrices was developed. The technique
has been used, although in a somewhat different format by
Cohen, March, and Olsen in their studies (1972)
.
In this research I am applying the Cycle of Choice to
a voting situation. For each voter an initial preference is
assumed of greater or lesser degree for each of three politi-
cal alternatives in the campaign. This initial attitude or
preference for each of the possible choices is represented
in terms of strength numbers. In this discussion the first
strength number considered will refer to the Republican
alternative, the second strength number refers to the Demo-
cratic alternative and the third number to some Other alterna-
tive. Each individual's attitude can be represented as a
1x3 matrix containing three attitude strength numbers. The
matrix (.6, .3, .1) indicates that for a particular individual
at a particular point in time he considers alternative one,
the Republican alternative to be a 0.6 on a scale of 0.0 to
1.0 when ranked relative to the other two possibilities. He
considers the Democratic alternative to be a .3 out of 1.0,
and the Other alternative to be a 0.1. Alternate numbering
schemes could have been chosen to illustrate these prefer-
ences but for simplicity this program uses strength numbers
which sum to 1.0 over the range of alternatives.
31

In order to represent a particular individual's behav-
ior at a particular point in time the program employs a 1 x 3
matrix similar to the one used for his attitude. If an
individual's behavior is constrained to only one of three
possibilities his voting behavior can be represented as three
index numbers. Since this illustration, by design, is con-
cerned with a relatively unambiguous situation an individual's
behavioral action is defined by the actual lever he pulls
in the voting booth. If he does not pull any lever or votes
for something other than Republican or Democrat the simulation
will classify these as "Other" behavior. The matrix (0,1,0)
for example, indicates that this particular individual voted
for the second alternative, in this case, the Democratic one.
Notice that in this matrix there is a single index number with
a value of 1 and the other two have values of zero. In
accordance with this model an individual is permitted to act
in only one of three possible ways at a particular point in
time.
It should be kept in mind that the present discussion
is merely describing the techniques employed to represent the
major variables in the Complete Cycle of Learning. When this
has been completed the discussion will go into detail on the
representation of the linkages between the variables.
The next variable to be considered is the organizatinal
outcome. Like individual behavior it is represented as a
1x3 matrix. Based on the actions taken by the majority of
32

the voters a particular political alternative becomes the
organizational decision. The mechanics of this process
are described in a later section on linkages.
The last variable to be represented is the environ-
mental situation. In order to describe the environment
at a particular point in time a 1x3 matrix is employed. As
in the individual behavioral matrix we represent the environ-
mental response to the voting process by a series of index
numbers. In this example it seems reasonable that in a
political election there is generally consensus among the
participants on how it will be known that a particular outcome
was attained or not. If we stipulate that only one of three
possible outcomes can result from the process then a matrix
of zeroes and a one will adequately describe the situation.
The matrix (0,0,1) indicates that at a particular point in
time the environmental outcome was generally agreed to be
the third alternative. In this case the alternative other
than the Republican or Democratic options was attained.
2. Linkage 1; Individual Attitude Formation
In the representation of the learning cycle I state
that an individual's attitude in the current time period is a
weighted sum of the environmental outcome and his attitudes
in past periods. Implicit in the statement is the notion
that an individual's current attitude is also dependent upon
organizational outcomes and individual behaviors in past
periods. That is because these factors serially led from
33

one to another and ultimately led up to the environmental
outcomes and attitudes which are currently being considered.
It may be asked why there is no direct provision for
an individual to consider future implications of current
activity. Studies by the Social Science Research Council
seem to show that consideration of just past behaviors is
adequate for predictive purposes. They found that by assuming
the probability of an individual voting for a particular party
is equal to the frequency with which he has voted for that
party in recent past periods they obtained results as accurate
as the public opinion polls (Mosteller, 194 9)
.
Alfred Schutz provides an additional reason which
helps justify the omission of explicit future consideration
in this model.
The actor projects his action as if it were
already over and done with and lying in the
past. It is a full blown, actualized event,
which the actor pictures and assigns to its
place in the order of experience given to
him at the moment of projection. Strangely
enough, therefore, because it is pictured
as completed, the planned act bears the
temporal character of pastness ... . The
fact that it is thus pictured as if it
were simultaneously past and future can
be taken care of by saying that it is
thought of in the future perfect tense.
(Schutz, 1967)
Since this research deals with a situation where
mechanisms are well-defined and cues are non-ambiguous it
is likely that a general consensus of which outcome was
attained is possible. This should enable us to use the same
environmental outcome matrix as an input in the determination
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of each individual's current attitude. As in the real world,
the specific values in the environmental matrix can change
over time, but for a single period in time we will consider
only one value of the matrix as an input to the next iteration
of the learning cycle.
In addition to the environment, past attitudes are a
factor in determining current attitude. Partisanship in the
current period may depend on the strength of attitudes held in
earlier periods, or be greatly affected by preferences that
have become detached from the current situation over many
periods of time.
3 . Linkage 2; Individual Behavior Determination
In order to make the transition from individual
attitude to individual behavior the following procedure is
proposed. An individual's anticipated behavior is assumed a
weighted sum of his current attitude and his past behaviors.
His current attitude for a given alternative is relevant
because its magnitude has significance. McPhee refers to
this as voter interest and compares it to the notion of
"indifference" curves found in economic theory (McPhee, 1962)
.
If a particular political campaign has great appeal, and there-
by results in strength numbers of high value for one or two
alternatives, then the voter response level could be high. If
the contest is a dull one, the strength numbers for the Republi-
can, and Democratic alternatives might both be low, and the
individual response might be not to vote at all. In this
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model that would be classified as an "Other" action. In
other words the attitudinal matrix indicates the relative
ranking of the alternatives as well as giving an indication
of whether or not any action is to occur at all.
In addition to the influence of current attitude past
behaviors influence the determination of current behaviors.
Besides the statistical significance which the Social Science
Research Council found in 1949, the formation of voting
habits, or traditions suggest the importance of past behaviors
on current behavior. The earlier quotation from Schutz re-
affirms the possible role of behavior being considered as if
it had already taken place.
The computer program represents the linkage to indi-
vidual behavior as a probability equation with appropriate
likelihoods assigned to each of the different behavioral
alternatives. These likelihoods directly incorporate the
effects of past behaviors and current attitude.
The specific behavioral action taken by an indivi-
dual is then probabilistically determined basing the result
on these likelihoods.
4 . Linkage 3: Determination of Organizational Outcome
There are four broad types of theories used to des-
cribe the processes involved in major political decisions.
Specifically they are referred to as democratic theories,
interest group theories, decision process theories, and




In order to keep the situation relatively simple the
democratic theory has been assumed. The democratic theory
assumes an "electorate" delimited according to specific cri-
teria such as formal position or period of membership in the
organization. This electorate decides policy according to
certain decision-making procedures. Whenever choices are made
the alternative selected and enforced is the alternative most
preferred by the electorate. In choosing among alternatives,
the one preferred by the greater number is selected. The
theory also stipulates that voters are considered basically
equal to one another when the votes are counted (Ibid, 1971) .
This process is simulated in the computer program by
algebraically summing the behaviors of all individuals. The
alternative receiving the majority of the votes is defined as
the organizational outcome. A 1x3 matrix analagous to the
behavior matrix is used to represent this outcome.
Since the point of this reserach is to explore the
Complete Cycle of Choice in its simple form explicit considera-
tion of critical mass behavior or social interaction effects
has been omitted. Inclusion of these factors as refinements
to the model is recommended in future studies.
5. Linkage 4; Environmental Response to Organizational
Decision
Earlier sections of this thesis have discussed in
great detail the particular characteristics of the voting
scenario which allow us to say that there will be general
consensus among the participants that a particular outcome
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has been attained. We consider the environment at this point
in the cycle to be an output of organizational action. Be-
cause of the close coupling designed into the voting scenario
we will mathematically portray the environmental outcome as being
equal to the organizational outcome. In other situations
this may not be appropriate but for this one there seems to
be enough well-defined mechanisms and cues to permit it.
After the environmental outcome has been determined
it is used as input to the formulation of new individual
attitudes, and the cycle repeats itself.
In order to simultaneously consider the attitudes
and behaviors of more than one individual a matrix has been
used to store the values of all individuals 1 attitudes, and
a second matrix is used to store everyone's behaviors in a
given time period. These matrices were developed to facili-
tate the processing of several individual's behavioral and
attitudinal changes in one single operation rather than
computing each individual's spearately. Appendix B provides
illustrations of these matrices and several others which
streamlined the computations. The organization was arbi-
trarily defined to consist of fifteen individuals. Other
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Explanation of Symbols and Abbreviations Used in
Flowchart of Learning Cycle
A = Individual attitude in period t
BU . = Anticipated individual behavior in period t
B. = Actual individual behavior in period t
E. = Environmental response in period t
E. , = Environmental response in period t-1
f , = Probabilistic function used to determine
actual individual behavior (B. ) based on
knowledge of anticipated individual behavior
(BU ) in period t.
f . . . = Arithmetic function used to determine
majority . . , ,~ . , , ,J J organizational outcome (0 ) based on actual
behaviors of majority of individuals.
0. = Organizational outcome in period t.
RK = Attitudinal learning coefficient used as
weighting factor in equation for determining
individual attitude (A )
.
RG = Behavioral learning coefficient used as weighting
factor in equation for determining anticipated
behavior (BU )
.
10 Iterations = Number of times the learning cycle
is completed using a single set of initial
conditions
.
500 Iterations = Number of sets of initial conditions
that are randomly determined and used as
inputs to the learning cycle.
Summary Statistics =
1) counts of the number of organizational outcomes
for each of three alternatives.
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2) counts of the number of individuals out of a
total population of 15 individuals whose
attitude in the final period is >_ 0.7.
3) counts of the number of individuals out of a
total population of 15 individuals whose final
behavior equalled their initial behavior.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION DATA
A. INITIAL CONDITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The computer simulation of the Complete Cycle of Choice
employs initial attitudes, initial behaviors, initial
environmental outcomes, and learning coefficients as inputs
to the model. In order to exercise the model under different
combinations of these inputs a Monte Carlo sampling technique
has been used to obtain a manageable number of cases that
adequately represent the entire population of possible cases.
This follows an analytic procedure developed by Cyert and
March (1963)
.
Referring to Figure 3-2 it can be seen that a set of
initial conditions is generated at the start of the learning
cycle. After an arbitrary number of iterations (in this case
10) a new set of initial conditions is generated for the next
series of iterations through the cycle. This research will
examine the performance of the model in relation to 500 sets
of randomly generated initial conditions.
Figure 3-2 also indicates that after the arbitrary number
of iterations through the cycle several summary statistics are
generated. The number of Republican organizational outcomes
in 10 periods, the number of Democratic organizational outcomes
in 10 periods, and the same for the Other Organizational Out-
comes are the first three statistics. The next three statis-
tics are counts of the number of individuals in a population
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of 15 individuals whose final attitude for the Republican party
is greater than or equal to 0.7, the number whose final
attitude for the Democratic party is greater than or equal
to 0.7/ and the number whose final attitude for the Other
alternative is grea-er than or equal to 0.7. Preferences
above 0.7 will be considered "strong" preferences for dis-
cussion purposes (McPhee, 1971, pg . 473). The last statistic
to be generated is a count of the number of individuals whose
final behavior is equal to their initial behavior.
B. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE DATA
A frequency table was obtained for each of the variables
employed in the model using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) . The behavioral and attitudinal learning
coefficients were distributed evenly among all the different
possible values. The initial attitudinal preferences tended
to be at the lower end of the scale. The mean value of the
initial preferences was .33 for all three political alterna-
tives. Looking at initial individual behavior there appears
to be an equal distribution of votes for each of the three
parties. The initial environmental outcomes were evenly split
amongst the three possible alternatives (see Appendix C for
frequency analysis printout)
.
The results of the frequency analysis of the initial con-
ditions are not surprising since the values were all randomly
generated. Initial conditions were not obviously biased
towards any one political alternative in particular. For
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that reason the values of the summary statistics generated
as output of the model are somewhat unexpected. Frequency
plots of the number of organizational outcomes show 187 cases
where 10 out of 10 organizational outcomes were Republican.
The Democratic alternative was chosen by the organization
10 out of 10 times in 111 cases, while the Other alternative
was chosen 10 out of 10 times in 102 cases. These figures
are interesting in two respects. First it seems to be a
characteristic of the model that the organizational outcome
attained in the first period is quite often attined in all
the other periods as well. This pattern was apparent in 400
out of the 500 cases analyzed. The second trend revealed in
the frequency plots was that out of a total of 5000 organi-
zational choices made during the exercise of the model 2,324
were for the Republican alternative while only 1,440 were
Democratic, and 1,236 were Other. Similar results were
obtained during an earlier exercise of the model with 1000
choices. In that earlier simulation 488 Republican, 291
Democratic, and 221 Other Organizational outcomes were
attained.
Considering the frequency analysis alone it appears that
for a series of learning trials there seems to be a tendency
for a single political alternative to be chosen by the organi-
zation in all 10 trials of that series. Additionally, although
the initial attitudes tended to be at the lower end of the
scale the final attitudes were usually greater than 0.7 for
the party chosen 10 out of 10 times.
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Another pattern to emerge is for one party to be chosen
by the organization a significantly larger number of times
than the other two alternatives. Perhaps this is due to some
combined effect of several variables which will be revealed
in the regression analysis.
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
A regression analysis was performed on all 500 cases of
the data generated by the computer simulation of the Complete
Cycle of Choice. Using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences a step-wise regression was used to generate "R
squared" values. The initial attitudinal, behavioral, and
environmental conditions as well as the learning coefficients
were considered the independent variables while the summary
statistics were treated as dependent values. A table of
correlation coefficients between all of the variables was
also included in the analysis.
Since the value of the third index (strength) number in the
attitudinal, behavioral, and environmental matrices can be directly
determined by knowing the first two numbers they were not
included as part of the step-wise regressions. With these
index numbers omitted the correlation tables showed very low
correlations between the independent variables, which is what
is desired.
The stepwise regression on the number of Republican organi-
zational outcomes as predicted by the independent variables








1. Number of Rep Org. Outcomes (Dependent Variable)
Independent Variables RSQ ARSQ
Init. Environment (Rep. Index)
Init. Individ. Behav. (Rep. Index)
Init. Attitude (Rep. Index)
Behav. Learning Coeff. (RG)
Attitud. Learning Coeff. (RK)
Similarly the Democratic alternative was predicted as follows
2. Number of Democr. Org. Outcomes (Dependent Variable)
Independent Variables RSQ ARSQ
Init. Individ. Behav. (Dem. Index) .262 .262
Init. Environment (Dem. Index) .385 .123
Init. Attitude (Dem. Index) .421 .036
Behav. Learning Coeff. (RG) .431 .010
Init. Environment (Rep. Index) .436 .005
The independent variables account for approximately 42%
of the variance in the dependent variable which is statis-
tically significant for a sample of 500 cases.
At this point it is interesting to note that the ranking
of independent variables in the step-wise regression of the
number of individuals with strong Republican preferences in
the final period, and the step-wise regression of the number
of individuals with strong Democratic preferences in the





These numbers indicate that the number of organizational
outcomes for a particular party, as well as strong prefer-
ences for that same party are much more sensitive to initial
environmental conditions and initial voting behavior than to
initial attitudes or learning coefficients. The close corre-
lation between strong final attitudes for a particular
alternative and the number of organizational outcomes for
that alternative turns out to be exactly .95 as shown in the
correlation table in Appendix D. The relatively low correla-
tion between organizational behavior and initial attitudes is
shown by the same correlation tables to be .01.
Tying these results to the earlier discussion on the
propensity for one party to be chosen in all 10 iterations it
seems reasonable to suppose that people in a voting situation
are most sensitive to the initial environmental outcome and
their own initial behavior. They tend to base their actions
in the next period on the same conditions, and so on through
the series. This leads to a uniform organizational decision
pattern with the party first chosen by the organization, being
chosen in every other period. Since the organizational out-
come is exactly equal to the environmental outcome the con-
stant exposure to this influential variable causes strong
preferences for that particular outcome to develop.
This research has only considered the simple case where
the initial attitudes of the individuals are identical. In
order to pusue the analysis further a non-homogeneous group
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is proposed for future research. By using different initial
attitudes for each of the individuals in the population it
would be possible to better understand the attitudinal changes
over a series of elections.
Another interesting variation might be to assign weighting
factors to the behaviors of certain individuals in the popula-
tion. Those with relatively high weights could be thought
of as leaders or high-influence groups.
The regression analysis on the number of individuals
whose final behavior equalled their initial behavior showed
this statistic to be most sensitive to initial Republican
behavior. This was unexepected since the initial behaviors
were evenly split amongst the 3 alternatives. Further




The preceding two chapters have developed and analyzed
a computer simulation of a basic decision-making model. In
particular a voting scenario was the vehicle used to examine
the performance of the Complete Cycle of Choice. Three
alternatives were considered by the individuals in the dis-
cussion, and then each voter made a specific decision. These
individual actions were aggregated into a collective behavior,
and then the environmental "response" was determined.
This research dealt with a simple decision-making situa-
tion in order to keep the model simple. More complex situa-
tions would necessitate the formulation of more complex, less
obvious models. Many of the models used by corporations and
government agencies to formulate strategies or make long-
range decisions are implicitly based on the Complete Cycle
of Choice. A review of decision models used for top manage-
ment planning revealed that underlying the detailed complexi-
ties of the specific models were the basic information flows
and processes of the Cycle of Choice (Ozbekan 1965, Jantsch
1969, Steiner 1969)
.
Recalling the Navy manpower problem discussed earlier
in the thesis there seems to be a similarity between the
decision processes involved in choosing to stay in the ser-
vice, choosing to get out, or choosing some other alternative
(e.g., delaying the choice) and the voting scenario described
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in the simulation. The manpower problem is obviously more
complex than the closely connected, well-defined situation
analyzed in this thesis. The Complete Cycle of Choice how-
ever, appears to be at least a first approximation to the
Navy situation. Using the simulations presented in this
thesis as a core, it is possible to elaborate, expand, and
improve it until it provides a reasonable representation of
the actual situation.
The first step towards this end is for manpower strategists
to study the operating realities of their system, and to
determine the objectives of the simulation. Once the model
becomes purposeful, data should be collected and used to
determine relationships between the variables. These rela-
tionships become the basis for the computer program. The
development of the simulation is an iterative process with
adjustments made until it provides useful information.
As stated earlier in this section the model presented in
this computer simulation is only a first estimate of the Navy
manpower situation. One suggested improvement is the con-
sideration of social interraction effects as described in the
second chapter of this thesis. The inclusion of critical
mass behavior is only a second step towards the development
of a useful model but if enough steps are taken the goal will
be attained.
Another improvement might be to consider future behaviors
and their present implications in the decision process. This
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thesis found behavioral habits for organizations to develop
which we based heavily on the first decision made in a series
of decisions. Manpower strategists might want to consider the
importance of this in making sure that initial behaviors,
especially during the first enlistment term, are favorable
to the needs of the Services. The research by Schelling
builds heavily on this concept (1978). His discussion of the
"dying seminar" yields the same behavior patterns as were
obtained in the frequency analysis of the computer simulation.
The analysis also found strong preferences to develop based
on continued exposure to a particular environment. If man-
power strategists find it impossible to develop a "nation-
wide" environment conducive to the recruiting situation they
might want to consider the creation of "local" environments
which will encourage a pro-military service attitude to be
developed.
In closing it can be said that this research has at
least laid out the basic groundwork for future research into
one class of manpower models. In choosing the voting scen-
ario I was more interested in the long-term process of
political socialization, rather than the prediction of the
outcome of a particular election. Successive elections are
like successive learning trials. The analysis did not
consider single trials but rather the cumulative effects
over a longer period of time. Perhaps future researchers
will benefit from the discussion presented, and be able to
incorporate some of the ideas presented into further improve-
ment of the decision-making model.
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SAMPLE OF SIMULATION MODEL OUTPUT
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OF INTERNAL PROCESSES
WITHIN SIMULATION MODEL
NLN3ER OF THIS SET OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
INITI/L ATTITUCE *W* IX
C.6C C.2C 0.20 3.60 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.20
C.6C C.iC C.iC C6C C.20 C.20 0.60 0.20 0.20
0.60 0.20 0.20 O.oJ O.iO 0.20 0.60 C.20 0.20
C.6C C.?C 0.2C 0.60 0.2) 0.20 0.60 0.21 0.20
0.60 0.20 O.iO 0.60 0.20 C.2C C.6C C.20 0.20
VALUES «K AND PG 0.30 0.30
niTT-L ENVIRONMENTAL GUTC CME
1.0 0.0 0.0 I.00 0.0 0.0 1.00 CO 0.0
l.CC c.c C.C l.CC 0. c CO I .00 0.0 0.0
1.00 o.c c.c l.OC o.c CO L.OC CO 0.0
I. 0.0 0.0 1 .00 .0 0.0 I .00 0.0 .0
I.OC c.c C.C l.CC 0.0 CO I .00 3.0 0.0
INITIAL EEl-AVJOrlAL ACT ITS MU* IX
l.CC C.C CO 1 .30 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 .0
l.OC C.C c.c i.co o.c c.c l.CC CO CO
I. 0.0 0.0 I .00 0.0 CO 1.00 0.0 0.0
l.CC c.c CO I. 30 .0 CO I .00 CO 0.0
1.00 0.0 c.c I. CO CO CO l.CC CO 0.0
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oKU'ietP 0* ITERATIONS IF CY<*LE
ATTITICE AfTfcR LEARMOC NA'PIX
C.ttd L.Cd C.Ct C.E8 C. C6 C.06 0.68 C. 06 0.06
O.fl* 0.06 (J .06 0.88 0.06 0.06 0.38 C.06 0.06
C.c8 C. 06 0. 0t> 0.38 0.06 0.06 0.<18 0.06 0.06
o.d8 o.ot c.C6 c.aa o.c c.o& o.ea c. 06 o.o*
C.S8 0.06 0.06 .38 0.06 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.06
PKC TIMES ENWPCN. HATPIX
.70 o.c o.c 0.70 o.c CO 0.7C CO o.c
0. 7., o.c 0.0 o.ro 0.0 0.0 .70 0.0 .0
0. 70 c. c c. c C. 7C o.c CO 0. 70 0.0 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 .70 0.0 0.0 0. 10 0.0 0.0
C.7C c.c 0.0 0. 70 0.0 0.0 . 70 0.0 0.0
LNSTwNOA POI 250 eEHAV. Af£P IEASMNG m/>t 3IX
.9 2 0.04 C.C4 (..^2 C.C* C.04 0. S3 C. 04 0.04
C.92 J. J4 0.04 0.92 0.0'* C .04 0.92 0.04 0.04C9i I..C4 C. C4 C S2 0. 04 C.04 0.92 O.Ot 0.04
0.92 0.04 0.04 ^.92 O.C C.Ct 0.92 C.04 0.04
C.S2 C. C4 C.C4 C.12 0.04 O.Of 0.92 0.04 0.04
STANDa PD UEO eEHAV. AF'ER IRNG. NAT SIX
1.00 0.0 CO 1.00 0. c C. 1. oc CO CO
I .Od CO CO I. 00 .0 0.0 1 .oc CO 0.0
l.OC c. c c. c L.CC o.c CO I. 00 0.0 0.0
1.0 c 0.0 CO 1.00 o.c c.c i.cc CO 0.0
1. 0.0 CO I .JO .0 0.0 I .0 0.0 0.0
ORGAN! Z.A 11?* AL OUTCOME MATRIX
1.00 O.u O.U
ei>w f c^NE^-/t ci t cc m e M *rRix
l.OC cc cc
CO*vrPTEJ ENVlR. OUTCOME MATRIX
I .00 0.0 o.o i .oo O .0 C.U 1.00 CO 0.0
l.CC c.c CO l.JO .0 0.0 I .0 0.0 0.0
l.CC c.c C.C l.CC CO CO I. 00 CO cc
1 .0>! CO CO 1 .00 .0 0.0 l.OC CO 0.0








i ia .! ,-l .„Ll-. ,.rt Blati it
(..
NUMEER Cf ITEfAT ICNS OF OCLE
AMI TIDE AFTER LEARM KG NA'RIX
0.96 0.02 O.Ji 0.96 O.C C C2 C.96 CO? 0.02
0.1(3 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02
C.96 C. C2 C. C2 C. S6 C.C2 C.02 0.96 0.02 0.02
0.96 0.C2 CC2 C.96 0.02 C.02 0.S6 C.02 0.02
C.96 C.02 0.02 0.96 0.02 C .Oi 0.96 0.02 0.02
c Kn THES ENVIRON. MATRIX
0.70 0.0 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.0 0.7C CO 0.0
C.7C C.C 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.0 0.70 0.3 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 0.70 0.0 C.C 0.7C CO 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.0 0.70 CO 0.0
C.7C C.C C.C 0.70 C.C C.C 0.70 0.0 0.0
ONST'-NOASCIZEC 9EH*,V. AFTER LEARNING MATRIX
0.97 ').0l 0.01 0.V7 0.01 0.01 0.97 COl 0.01
C.97 C.Cl 0.01 0. u 7 O.OL 0.01 0.97 0.01 .01
C.97 C.Oi O.01 0.97 O.Cl COl C.9 7 COl 0.01
0.97 0.01 0.01 0.97 O.Ol 0.01 0.97 COl 0.01
C97 C.Cl C.Cl C.9J C.Cl COl 0.97 0.01 0.01
STANDARDIZED eEHAV. AFTER LRNS. MATRIX
1 .00 0.0 C.C I. 00 o.o 0.0 I .00 CO 0.0
l.OC 0. c 0.0 I .00 .J 0.0 I .0 0.0 .0
l.OC C.C C.C l.CC O.C C.C l.CC CO 0.0
1 .0 ) 'J.J o.o l.JO .0 CO I. 00 CO 0.0
l.CC C.C CO 1.00 ).
)
CO I .00 0.0 0.0
JRGANIZ4TIQNAL OUTCOME MATRIX
1.00 0.0 0.0
ENU RONMENTAL CCTCCfE MTSIX
1 .00 0.0 0.0
CONVERTED EMVIR. OUTCOME MATRIX
I. 'JO 0.0 0.0 I .00 0.0 1.0 I .00 0.0 0.0
l.OC C. C C. c l.CC O.C CO I .00 0.0 0.0
I -JO 0.0 C.C 1.00 0.0 0.0 I. 00 CO 0.0
l.OC O.C 0.0 I .00 .0 0.0 1 .00 a.o 0.0






M.MKER CF ITERATIONS CF OCIE
ATTITHOE AFTER LEARNING MATRIX
0.9<J 0.01 0.01 0.99 ).3l 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01
C.9S C. C 1 C.C1 CSS C.Cl C.C1 0.99 0.01 0.01
0.99 0.01 C.Cl C.99 .0 I C.Ol 0.99 C.Ol 0.01CSS C.Cl 0.01 0.99 O.01 j.Ol 0.99 .0 I 0.01
C.9S C.Cl C.Cl C.99 O.Cl C.Cl 0.9S C.Ol 0.01
PKC M^EG E^IKN. MATRIX
C.7C C.C C C C. 7C 0.0 CO 0.70 0.0 0.0
.70 0.0 0.0 0.7u O.C C.C 0.7C CO 0.0
. 70 . C C. J 0.70 J .J •J.O .70 0.0 .0
C.7C C.C C. C C. 7C 0. C C.C 0.70 0.0 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 U.70 .0 0.0 0.7C CO 0.0
UHSTJT'CA'C UtC EEKW. I FT E 5 LEARNING MATRIX
CSS CCC C.CO 0.W9 J. CO COO 0.99 0.00 0.00
0.99 O.OC 0.00 0.99 O.CC CCC CSS COO 0.00
0.99 0.0) 0.00 0.99 O.JO 0.00 0.9 9 0.00 0.00
CSS CCC CCC CSS O.CC COO 0.°9 J. 00 0.00
0.^9 O.UC CCC C.*9 O.GO 0.00 0.99 COO 0.00
fT/UASCUEC EfMV. AFTER IRMG. MATRIX
l.OC 0. C CO 1.10 0.0 0.0 I. 0.3 0.0
1 .oc CO 0.0 1.00 0.0 C.C l.CC CO 0.0
1.0 J O.J o.o 1.00 0.0 CO 1 .00 0.0 .0
l.CC C C C C l.CC O.C C.C I .CJ 0.0 0.0
1.0 J 0.0 C.C 1 .OU O.C CO 1 .oc CO 0.0
CRGAMZATICML CJTCGME MATRIX
l.CC C.C C.C
ENVI P^-.'MFHTAL .5UTC1ME "ATRIX
1.00 O.C CO
ccMERitc e^w^. cutcok v^mx
l.CC C.C C.C l.CC C.C C.C l.OC CO 0.0
I .0 0.0 0.0 1.00 .0 0.0 1.00 CO CO
l.OC C.C 0.0 I. 00 0.0 O.ri 1 .00 0.0 0.0
l.UC CO 0.0 1.00 O.C C.C l.OC CO 0.0






MWBER OF ITERATIONS OF C VCLE
^TTI'UCE 4 FT 6 P LE/FNHG M <TR IX
l.CC C.CC O.OC l.OC O.CO C.OC 1.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 O.CO C.CC i.CO o.cc cue l.OC COO O.JO
1. 00 O.OC O.JO 1 .JO 0.0) U.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
l.OC C.CC C.CC l.CC O.CO COO 1. 00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 COO 1.00 0.00 0.00
FKC 1ICE5 ENVIRCN. fATPK
C.7C CC C < C. 70 C. C CO 0. 7C CO 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 .70 .0 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.0
C.7C C. C C. J 0. 70 O.C CO 0.70 CO 0.0
0.70 0.0 CO 0. 70 0. C C 0. 7C CO O.C
0.70 0.0 0.0 .70 .0 0.0 .70 0.0 .0
LI^TANCAPCWEC EEhAV. 4F"E« LEARNING MATRIX
l.OC C.CC l.CC l.CC O.CO COO 1.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1. 00 COO 0.00
l.CC C.CC 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 O.CC C.CC 1.00 O.CO C.OC l.OC COO O.CO
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 l.OC COO CCO
STANOAPGl iEO EEHJV. AFTER L<<NG,






























CCNVER16Q ENWfl. CUTCCfE PATHU
l.CC CC CC 1.00 0.0 CO l.OC CO 0.0
L.JC 0.0 0.0 l.JO .0 0.0 I .OC CO CO
l.CC CC 0. J l.JO o.c CO I .00 0.0 0.0
I .00 0.0 o.o l.CO O.C CC l.CC CO 0.0












MJMBES OF ITERATIONS OF CYCLE
ATTITUOE AFTBt IEAFNING 'tJTRU
l.OC C.CC C. CC I. CO C.CO COO l.OC 0.00 0.00
i-oo o.co c.cc i.oo o.ca l.oo i.cc coo o.oo
l.OC C.CO 0.0C 1 .0 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
l.OC C.CC C.CC l.CC O.CO COO 1.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0-00 0.00 1.00 0.00 COO 1.00 COO 0.00
FKC 1IMEJ ENWflCN. fATPK
CJC C.C CC C.7C 0.0 CO C. 7C CO 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 .70 .0 CO .70 0.0 0.0
C7C C C CO 0. 70 O.C CC 0.70 0.0 0.0
0.70 O.C C.C C 70 O.C CO 0.7C CO 0.0
0.70 0.0 0.0 .70 .0 0.0 .10 0.0 0.0
USTANCAFCI2EC EEhAV. AF'EF LEARNING matrix
l.OC C.CC C.CC l.CC O.CO C.CC l.CC COO 0.00
1.00 O.OO COO 1.00 0.00 COO 1.00 COO O.CO
l.CC C.CC COC 1.30 J.OJ n.00 1.03 CO) 0.00
1.00 O.CC C.CC I. CO O.CC COC l.OC COO 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 O.OO l.CC COO 0.00
STANCAFOI itL E£hJ!V. Af" ER LRMG. MATRIX








l.OC C.C C. c
1 .00 0.0 0.0
CO I .00 0.0 0.0
C.C l.CC CO 0.0
.0 I .0 0.0 0.0CO 1.0 0.0 0.0





C0NV£«1E0 ENWfl. CUTCG^E MATRIX
1.00 0.0 CC 1.00 O.C CO 1.00 CO 0.0
1.00 0.0 0.0 1 .00 o .o 0.0 1 .00 0.0 .0
l.OC C.C c c l.CC 0.0 CO 1 .00 0.0 0.0
I .0 0.0 0.0 1.00 .0 0.0 1.00 CO 0.0
l.CC CC 0.0 1.00 0.0 0.0 I. 0.0 0.0
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APPENDIX C: FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION
DATA
ORGLPNG £NM_YS! C CP ^-I^ULATIC^ CMA ? « C
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APPENDIX D: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION DATA
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